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Pedagogy and Critique:
Values and Assumptions
in the Law School Classroom
RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL†
An old joke has it that a rabbi, a minister, and a priest
were out fishing when the weather took a sudden cooler
turn. Without a word, the minister stepped out of the
rowboat and walked across the water’s surface to retrieve
his jacket from shore. A short while later, the rabbi made
the same journey, returning to the boat sweater in tow. The
priest—experiencing chills from the weather as well as from
witnessing his colleagues’ seemingly miraculous if not
entirely unprecedented feat—offered a silent prayer,
stepped gingerly over the gunnel, and sank straight to the
bottom of the lake. Whereupon the rabbi turned to the
minister and said, “I guess we should have told him where
the rocks are.”
Jim Atleson’s Values and Assumptions in American
Labor Law1—published just over a quarter century ago—
set out to tell us where the rocks are in American labor law.
Celebrated in a symposium hosted by the Baldy Center and
† Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development,
University of Connecticut. Many thanks to the editors of the Buffalo Law
Review for their extraordinary patience and for providing this virtual platform
for my much-delayed contribution to the symposium discussed in this essay; to
Fred Konefsky and Dianne Avery for their gracious hospitality during the live
event; to Fred and Dianne as well as to Karl Klare, Jeremy Paul, Kerry Rittich,
and Jack Schlegel for thoughtful and encouraging reactions to an earlier draft;
and to Jim Atleson, whose scholarship, teaching, and mentoring have set the
standard for a generation of progressive labor scholars.
1. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES
(1983).
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recently published in the Buffalo Law Review,2 the book was
part of a larger “demystification” project—traceable to the
legal realists and reinvigorated with a nigh Oedipal
vengeance by scholars associated with critical legal studies
(“cls”)—the aim of which was to explore what “really” goes
on beneath the surface of doctrinal analysis and apology.
Prior to cls—back when we were “all realists now”—the
usual suspects were “policy” (per the Realist Lite line I
heard in my own first-year law classes circa 1975) and the
contents of the judge’s breakfast (in the dismissive soundbyte version). But the Reloaded Realism of cls focused
instead on ideology as the animating force in law and
legality.
Ironically, critical scholars took the pretensions of
doctrine far more seriously than had earlier demystification
efforts—not for nothing were we called the New
Langdells3—carefully exploring all the talk of rules and
exceptions, principles and policies, statutory language and
structure, legislative history and purposes, etc. for traces of
unexamined ideological commitments that might be
surfaced in the service of critique. And nowhere was that
effort more fruitful than in the law of the workplace, where
—Jim’s cls-distancing disclaimers notwithstanding—Values
and Assumptions took its place alongside the similarly
groundbreaking efforts of Karl Klare and Jim’s late, greatly
beloved colleague Alan Freeman.4
A word or two about the crit-distancing. In the course of
his remarks at the close of the live symposium, Jim was
emphatic that Values and Assumptions was not a “critical
legal study.” He struck a similar pose in the book itself,
going out of his way to disassociate himself from the claims
of his cls-identified contemporaries that the legal doctrine
they were busy dismantling served “to make contingent
2. Symposium on James Atleson’s Values and Assumptions in American
Labor Law, A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 629
(2009) [hereinafter Symposium].
3. See Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence
and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987).
4. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049 (1978); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act
and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV.
265 (1978).
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political and social choices seem inevitable or natural.”5
(Been a long time since we’ve heard that line.) Yet in the
same passage he pled guilty to “demystification”—
forthrightly acknowledging that his aim was “to unmask or
decode labor law”6—and, whatever the author’s intentions,
Values and Assumptions is a classic of the demystification
genre, debunking legalist claims of doctrinal entailment to
expose the ways in which judges and other legal decision
makers reach contestable results despite their “just doin’
my job, ma’am” professions. Indeed, Jim’s comments at the
symposium seemed to suggest that the reason for his
dismay at being lumped together with his cls-identified
contemporaries was not as much that he disagreed with
their work as it was that the lumping offends his visceral
contrarian streak, an attribute that for my money makes
him more like other prominent first-generation crits rather
than less.
But Values and Assumptions did differ from
contemporaneous critical scholarship in two important
respects, and each of those differences may help account for
the book’s enthusiastic reception among most labor law
scholars, crit-distancing and otherwise. There was first
Jim’s decision to put that felicitous appellation—“values
and assumptions”—in lights, while relegating talk of
“demystification” and “unmasking” to a footnote at the back
of the book and avoiding altogether any reference to
“deconstruction,” “trashing,” and other scary-sounding lingo
of the sort one might have encountered in the Lizard, the
official samizdat-style paper of cls for a brief period in the
mid-1980s.7 “Values and assumptions” is an expression you
can pretty safely take home to Mom, and attributing the
disconnect between decidedly anti-labor Supreme Court
opinions and the far more pro-labor statute they were
purporting to interpret to “values and assumptions” went
over far better in polite company than more muscular
claims about decision making driven by “ideology” likely
would have.
5. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 181 n.4; see also Dianne Avery & Alfred S.
Konefsky, James B. Atleson and the World of Labor Law Scholarship, 57 BUFF.
L. REV. 629, 639-41 (2009) (oral history quoting Atleson to the same effect).
6. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 181 n.4.
7. See generally Gary Minda, Remembering the Eighties: The Lizard Goes to
the AALS, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1161 (2007).
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This, I would argue, was more a rhetorical difference
than one of substance, for the doctrine-trumping “values
and assumptions” Jim famously uncovered—the “rocks”
hidden beneath the surface of doctrinal profession—were
profoundly ideological: that “the continuity of production
must be maintained” (and the statutory right to strike thus
narrowly circumscribed); that “employees, unless controlled,
will act irresponsibly” (whereas employers could be trusted
not to exploit the privileges and loopholes of labor law); that
employees—much like the servants of nineteenth-century
common law—owed a non-reciprocal duty of “respect and
deference” to their masters that “need not be earned but,
rather, was implicit in the employment relationship”; that
employees were merely guests in the workplace and their
statutory rights thus had to “compete with shadowy notions
about employer ownership”; and finally that employees
could play only a subservient role in workplace governance
because a full and genuine partnership would interfere with
the “inherent and exclusive managerial rights of
employers.”8 Referring to these notions as “values and
assumptions”—rather than, say, as the Five Pillars of
Capitalist Oppression—softened the blow of what was
otherwise a deeply convention-challenging account of
American labor law.
Jim’s book departed from what was widely assumed to
be cls orthodoxy in a second respect (and don’t get me
started on the causes and consequences of this assumption).
Referring to the patterns of thought he exposed and
critiqued as “values and assumptions” avoided the
suggestion that legal decision making is the product of some
sort of ruling class conspiracy, leaving open the kinder and
gentler possibility that judges are among the mystified
rather than the mystifiers. To be sure, most
contemporaneous cls work took as its starting point a
critique rather than an embrace of such “vulgar Marxist”
notions (in the formulation used by many early crits, doing
some distancing of their own) and explored a considerably
more complex relationship between ideology and law than
what was (and still is) frequently attributed to scholars
associated with cls. And in retrospect Jim’s shorthand
phrase may have erred in the opposite direction, suggesting
as it did a benign dynamic of individual rather than social
8. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 7-9.
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provenance; who among us, after all, doesn’t have values
and assumptions? But it was far more difficult for
mainstream academics to dismiss an account of judicial
decision making based on unexamined “values and
assumptions” than it would have been had Jim ascribed the
dynamic he so astutely unveiled to one big capitalist plot.
At all events, the principal reason for the book’s
continuing influence and nigh iconic status in our field is
that its basic point was undeniably right. To mention just a
few from the long list of labor law decisions scrutinized in
Values and Assumptions, there’s the famous dictum from
Mackay Radio9 (now routinely treated as law) that
employers may permanently replace strikers despite a
provision in the National Labor Relations Act declaring that
“[n]othing in this [Act] shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike[;]”10 there’s the holding in First National
Maintenance11 that employers may cease operations without
consulting the union representing their employees despite a
statutory provision requiring collective bargaining over
decisions affecting “rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment[;]”12 and
there’s the holding in Gateway Coal13 that employers may
punish employees who refuse to work for fear of abnormally
dangerous conditions unless the refusing employees
establish not only their “good faith”14—as required by the
language of the statute—but also the objective accuracy of
their assessment under a judicially improvised requirement
that the feared conditions “actually obtain.”15
As Jim convincingly demonstrated,16 decisions like these
are far more plausibly attributable to extra-legal
commitments—however conscious and whatever we call
9. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
10. National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
11. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-86 (1981).
12. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
13. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
14. Labor Management Relations Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (2006).
15. Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 386.
16. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 19-34 (discussing Mackay Radio), 111-35
(discussing First National Maintenance), 97-107 (discussing Gateway Coal).
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them—than to the supposed entailments of legal reasoning.
And as the papers in the published symposium authored by
an impressive line-up of contemporary labor scholars and
practitioners attest, that core insight continues to guide
progressive work in the labor law field to this day.17
*****
I want to focus the remainder of my essay on a related
but distinct legacy of Values and Assumptions—on the role
it played in the teaching of labor law during the decade or
two following its publication. Until I re-read the book in
preparation for the live symposium, I had forgotten that it
begins with a story about an incident in a labor law class
Jim taught early in his career. A puzzled student—reacting
to decisions like those recounted a moment ago—asked why
courts kept ignoring employee rights that were “clearly and
unequivocally set out in the National Labor Relations Act”
in favor of limitations that were “neither discussed in the
legislative debates and reports nor expressed in the
statute.”18 Jim described the St. Paul moment that the
question inspired thus:
I began patiently to answer with the verities I had been taught,
that no statute or right is absolute and that all rights had to be
balanced against competing interests. I could not continue.
Suddenly, the traditional dogma no longer made sense. Removing
blinders does not, in itself, create understanding. This book is an
19
attempt to answer the question.

In Jim’s characteristically modest account, then, a student
is the source of the question that . . . well, killed
conventional legal studies, and the initial audience for Jim’s
attempt to grapple with it was a law school class.
Jim thus “broke the seal” between frequently
dichotomous dimensions of legal academia—teaching and
scholarship—and in this he was not alone. My own
introduction to first-generation cls work was Duncan
Kennedy’s Contracts course in the fall of 1975, and his
seminal critical legal study—Form and Substance in Private

17. See Symposium, supra note 2.
18. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 1.
19. Id.
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Law Adjudication20—came out the following summer and
provided a virtual roadmap of that unforgettable class. Karl
Klare was likewise bringing critical scholarship to the
classroom and critical pedagogy to his writing—his
Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook21 is a
classic of the genre—and his success in doing so was
confirmed when the American Lawyer (at the time an
upstart publication seeking to become the Rolling Stone of a
profession otherwise extremely short on rock stars and
exposés) featured Karl and fellow traveler Roberto Unger
among a handful of the most popular and promising young
law professors in the U.S.
In retrospect, I think that a crucial link between critical
teaching and critical scholarship was the demystification
project. Law students—accustomed as they were to Socratic
and exam experiences that all too frequently produced the
sensation of drowning in the conventional legal materials—
were eager to learn “where the rocks are.” And for a
complex mix of reasons—to humanize the exercise of
professorial power, to avenge the injustices of our own
student experiences, and most of all to produce lawyers
better equipped to negotiate the terrain of legal analysis
and argument—scholars associated with cls were eager to
help students find their footing.
In an homage to such efforts by our own teachers, many
of us who entered the legal academy in the 1980s focused
our early publications on classroom exercises and
experiences: Jamie Boyle’s The Anatomy of a Torts Class22
and Jenni Jaff’s Frame-Shifting: An Empowering
Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning23
come quickly to mind, as does Jeremy Paul’s A Bedtime
Story, an engaging account of a child’s dispute with his
babysitter that has demonstrated to legions of beginning
students that they come to law school more familiar than
20. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
21. Karl E. Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979) (book review).
22. James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003
(1985).
23. Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching
and Learning Legal Reasoning, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1986).
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they’d ever imagined with the arguments routinely deployed
by American lawyers and judges.24 And my own “fifteen
minutes of fame” arrived when a classroom hypothetical—
included in an essay about cls and designed to prompt my
labor law students to think critically about why it is that
profits follow capital rather than labor—was reprinted in
the “Week in Review” section of the New York Times under
the caption “What the Fuss Is About.”25
*****
Values and Assumptions was published in 1983, the
year I left practice for teaching. I devoured the book in a
single sitting, sorry only that I hadn’t read it before I began
my half-decade as an appellate lawyer for the National
Labor Relations Board—where, like the priest in the
rowboat, for want of a map I had plunged into the abyss on
more than one occasion. Determined that things would be
different for my own students, I assigned the book as
required reading for my labor law class that year and for
many years after.
Early on, Values and Assumptions was a major hit with
the student audience. Naturally, it held the most appeal for
left-progressives who came to law school with a basic faith
in law as an instrument of social justice but didn’t much
like most of the law they were encountering in their classes.
For them, the book’s account of benevolent legislative
commands repeatedly subverted by unspoken judicial
“values and assumptions” rendered the many adverse
decisions lawless and illegitimate, producing the
exhilarating experience of seeing the emperor without
clothes.
The conservatives found themselves exhilarated in a
different way: “Of course we should privilege uninterrupted
production and employer property rights,” they would
argue, a little nervous about the methodology (none dared
call it judicial activism) but delighted to learn that at least
something stood between private enterprise and what they

24. Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915 (1988).
25. The hypothetical can be found in Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism
About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505, 527-28 (1987) and the
Times version at Jennifer A. Kingson, Harvard Tenure Battle Puts ‘Critical
Legal Studies’ on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1987, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6.
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perceived to be the liberal excesses of the Labor Act and the
NLRB.
The political moderates—meaning most of my students
—didn’t experience the exhilaration but nevertheless came
away from the book and our discussions of it sobered by
what they processed as the “anti-labor bias” of American
courts. Moreover, they were grateful for the powerful tool
that the “values and assumptions” analysis gave them for
organizing and understanding the voluminous course
materials; indeed, before “legal theory” developed a bad
name in student circles, this was a view that seemed to be
shared by my students of every political stripe.
As the years passed, however, class discussions and
exam-grading revealed that my students were increasingly
relying on sound-byte versions of the book’s rich and
nuanced arguments, many of them reading only the
introductory chapter (which conveniently listed the
previously mentioned Five Pillars) or a student digest of
same. The exhilaration that Values and Assumptions had at
one time generated gave way to increasingly rote and
stultified analyses, and at some point in the mid-1990s I
stopped assigning the book as required reading.
A number of factors, I think, had led to the diminished
efficacy of “values and assumptions” analysis in my
classroom. For one thing, I had myself begun to move on to
other interests in the labor law field. I found that I greatly
enjoyed teaching the intricacies of secondary boycott and
recognitional picketing law—topics that Jim’s book hadn’t
covered—and began devoting more class time to those topics
each year. Moreover, as a result of my involvement in the
1990s with an international network of progressive labor
law scholars and practitioners (Intell), I began to emphasize
international and comparative labor issues and also to
question the conventional boundaries of the field by
exploring immigration, poverty law, and work/family
conflict issues that had not previously been on my radar.
Likewise, I eagerly reconfigured my course to explore the
new organizing strategies developed by the labor movement
in the last decade and a half—strategies that rely less on
NLRB protection and enforcement and more on collective
self-help (thus increasing the importance of the limits on
secondary boycotts and recognitional picketing) as well as
recourse to areas of work law that lie beyond the reach of
the Labor Act (such as employment discrimination law,
FLSA, and OSHA). As a result, many of the topics covered
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in Values and Assumptions loomed less and less large in my
labor courses.
A second factor related to a generational shift in the
experiences and understandings that my students were
bringing to class—a shift revealed to me by an exercise I
conduct each year on the first day of class, when I ask each
student to write out a brief explanation of the basis for her
interest in the course and to state whether she or any
member of her family has ever belonged to a labor union.
When I started teaching at the University of Miami in 1983,
a large majority of my students responded affirmatively to
the latter query, many reporting first-hand experiences in a
unionized workplace. (That may seem surprising given that
Florida is a right-to-work state, but public sector unions
were and still are relatively robust there, and for a variety
of reasons an influx of police officers and public school
teachers were pursuing law degrees at Miami in the early
1980s. During that period there was likewise a substantial
cohort of former and soon-to-be former unionized employees
of South Florida-based airlines at various stages of
bankruptcy). By contrast, in a class I taught in the spring of
2000, not one of the students reported either first-hand or
familial union experience, reflecting the steep decline in
union density that had occurred in Florida and most
everywhere else since the early 1980s. As a result, my
principal challenge in teaching the labor law course was no
longer accounting for the anti-union skew of judicial
decision making but was instead helping my students to
understand just what a union is and why anyone would
want one.
I undertook a variety of strategies to fill that gap, at
first assigning books like John Hoerr’s account of the long
and successful organizing campaign among the support staff
at Harvard University26 and Jonathan Rosenblum’s account
of the ill-fated Arizona copper strike of 1983.27 Those books
got some traction with students, but eventually I found far
greater success when I started showing classic labor films
(such as Bread & Roses, Matewan, and Norma Rae) that
bring the experience of organizing to life for a generation
26. JOHN HOERR, WE CAN’T EAT PRESTIGE: THE WOMEN WHO ORGANIZED
HARVARD (1997).
27. JONATHAN D. ROSENBLUM, COPPER CRUCIBLE: HOW THE ARIZONA MINERS’
STRIKE OF 1983 RECAST LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN AMERICA (1995).
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seemingly more in the thrall of films than of books—or
perhaps merely more comfortable with their ability to
analyze the former than the latter in the presence of a bookloving law professor. Reference to such films has
considerably enriched and enlivened class discussion, and
perhaps at some point I’ll have the courage and the energy
to follow the lead of gifted classroom teachers like Roberto
Corrada and Marion Crain and permit my students to
unionize and engage in collective bargaining with me over
the terms and conditions of the labor law course—an
exercise that by all accounts brings the virtues as well as
the challenges of collective action and representation home
to students in a manner unmatched by even the most
compelling film.28
*****
But perhaps the most important reason that Values and
Assumptions had lost its “kick” in my classroom was that I
was relying too much on the book to get its core message
across to my students—and don’t doubt for a moment that
the message is as important to labor lawyers today as it was
in 1983. In recent years, I have thus attempted to provoke
my students into experiencing Jim’s St. Paul moment on
their own and have had considerable success by deploying
the following exercise when we study Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB,29 the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision permitting an
employer to bar union organizers from soliciting support or
distributing literature in the employee area of a shopping
center parking lot or indeed anywhere else on its property.30
Here, verbatim, is the opening sentence of the Lechmere
opinion:
This case requires us to clarify the relationship between the rights
of employees under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA

28. See, e.g., Roberto L. Corrada, A Simulation of Union Organizing in a
Labor Law Class, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 445 (1996).
29. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
30. For particularly illuminating analyses of the property access issue, see
Dianne Avery, Federal Labor Rights and Access to Private Property: The NLRB
and the Right to Exclude, 11 IND. REL. L.J. 145 (1989); Cynthia L. Estlund,
Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994).
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or Act), 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and the
31
property rights of their employers.

And here is the question I put to my students when I ask
them to read the case in preparation for class: If you were a
legal research and writing instructor at an American law
school, and the foregoing line appeared in a student paper,
what would you do with your red pen?
When the next class convenes, I can count on at least
one of my more meticulous students to point out that we’re
missing a legal citation—that the sentence in question
introduces two sets of rights, those of employees and those
of employers, but that only the former is accompanied by
the required reference to authoritative legal materials. I am
invariably tempted to follow up that response by asking
what employees have to do to secure rights (a) that require
no citation and (b) that win the way that employer rights do
in Lechmere, but time permitting I slow things down and
use the response as a springboard to the following
discussion.
Let’s give the Court a hand and provide the missing
citation. What is it? Silence. Is it in the Labor Act? Mass
shuffling of pages in the statutory supplement but
otherwise continued silence. Does the Court tell us elsewhere
in its opinion? More shuffling and more silence as—mirabile
dictu—neither source yields an answer.
If no one has figured out the game at this point, I
typically pose my next question: Well, where do property
rights usually come from? I’ll sometimes add a “From God?”
and then riff a bit on the Baltimore Catechism, but someone
will eventually force me back on track and respond that
state common law is ordinarily the source of property
rights. And that prompts my next question: If employer
property rights come from state common law, what should
happen when they conflict with federal statutory rights?
Quite a few students are able to respond to this one by
referring to the rock-paper-scissors hierarchy of legal
authority: statutes trump common law and federal law
trumps state law, so federal statutory rights should handily
play scissors to the paper of state common law. So why, I
then ask, did just the opposite happen here?

31. 502 U.S. at 529.
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This frequently leads to a useful digression about
whether the rock of the U.S. Constitution might be
responsible for breaking the federal statutory scissors in
Lechmere—i.e., whether a statute interpreted to give union
organizers access to the public areas of privately owned
shopping centers might constitute a “taking” under the
Fifth Amendment—but this line of reasoning doesn’t get us
very far, since (a) if the Supreme Court meant to declare a
reading of the Labor Act constitutionally infirm it would
almost surely have come right out and said so32 and (b) the
Court’s decision in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins33—
rejecting a “takings” challenge to a California state court
decision granting free speech rights to individuals in public
areas of shopping centers—pretty strongly suggests that a
grant of such access to labor organizers under federal law
wouldn’t constitute a “taking” either.
So I continue: Let’s assume that the Court is right and
that, when it comes to union organizing, state common law
property rights do trump federal statutory rights. If that’s
the case, what result if Lechmere arose in California?
Someone eventually figures out that the employer might
have a difficult time, since after Pruneyard California
employers don’t enjoy a state property law right to bar
shopping center access for individuals engaged in expressive
activities. Can this possibly be what Congress intended—
that in each case the NLRB is required to examine the
particulars of local property law and that employee statutory
rights will turn on the results of that inquiry? Is this a
plausible reading of the National Labor Relations Act? I
don’t tell them at this point that the NLRB has adopted
precisely that interpretation of Lechmere and thus looks to
state law in order to determine whether the employer in a
particular case in fact has a right to limit union access to
the property in question34—an approach that makes perfect
sense until you think about it for ten seconds. (To be sure, I
like the Board’s results, which tend to be far more favorable
to organizer access claims than the common law that
conservative Supreme Court Justices think they remember
from law school. But as a method of interpreting a federal
32. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (no such luck).
33. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
34. See, e.g., Farm Fresh, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 1424, 1425-26 (2000); Bristol
Farms, Inc. 311 N.L.R.B. 437, 439 (1993).
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statute, this is absurd—although, like most instances of
reductio ad absurdum, the problem lies in the premise, in
this case the Supreme Court’s assumption that common law
property rights limit employee rights under the Labor Act.)
So isn’t this really a question of statutory interpretation?
If employer common law property rights are to come into
play, isn’t it because Congress intended them to trump or
limit employee rights under the Labor Act? Is there anything
in the statute to support that claim? Murmuring and more
shuffling of books and papers. Does the opinion tie this point
to legislative history? Ditto.
Until eventually a student ventures: “Well, I think the
Court just assumed that property rights weren’t displaced
by the Labor Act.” Bingo, and now we can begin.

